VIVE LA DIFFÉRENCE III
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Abstract. We show that, consistently, there is an ultrafilter F on ω such that if N n = (P n ∪ Q n , P n , Q n , R n ) (for = 1, 2, n < ω), P n ∪ Q n ⊆ ω, and Q 
Introduction
In a previous paper [Sh 326] we gave two constructions of models of set theory in which the following isomorphism principle fails in various strong respects:
(Iso 1): If M , N are countable elementarily equivalent structures and F is a non-principal ultrafilter on ω, then the ultrapowers M * , N * of M , N with respect to F are isomorphic. As is well known, this principle is a consequence of the Continuum Hypothesis. Recall that Keisler celebrated theorem ( from [Ke67] ) says that, if 2 λ = λ + then two models, M, N of cardinality at most λ + (and vocabulary of cardinality ≤ λ) are elementarily equivalent iff for some ultrafilter F on λ, the ultrapowers M λ /F, N λ /F are isomorphic, this has given an algebraic characterization of elementary equivalence.
In [Sh 405] our aim originally was to give a related example in connection with the well-known isomorphism theorem of Ax and Kochen. In its general formulation, that result states that a fairly broad class of Henselian fields of characteristic zero satisfying a completeness (or saturation) condition are classified up to isomorphism by the structure of their residue fields and their value groups. That is, the statement that interest us in the second paper in this series [Sh 405], was:
(Iso 2): If F is a non-principal ultrafilter on ω, then the ultraproducts SAHARON SHELAH Theorem 0.1 (See [Sh 405]). It is consistent with the axioms of set theory that there is a non-principal ultrafilter F on ω such that for any two sequences of discrete rank 1 valuation rings (R i n ) n=1,2,... (i = 1, 2) having countable residue fields, any isomorphism F : n R 1 n /F −→ n R 2 n /F is an ultraproduct of isomorphisms F n : R 1 n −→ R 2 n (for a set of n's contained in F). In particular, F-majority of the pairs R 1 n , R 2 n are isomorphic. In the case of the rings F p [[t] ] and Z p , we see that (Iso 2) fails. For this our main work was to show the following statement which actually from model theoretic point of view is more basic and interesting.
Theorem 0.2 (See [Sh 405]).
It is consistent with the axioms of set theory that there is a nonprincipal ultrafilter F on ω such that for any two sequences of countable trees (T i n ) n=1,2,... for i = 1, 2, with each tree T i n countable with ω levels, and with each node having at least two immediate successors, if
n /F, then for any isomorphism F : T 1 −→ T 2 there is an element a ∈ T 1 such that the restriction of F to the cone above a is the restriction of an ultraproduct of maps F n : T 1 n −→ T 2 n . From a model theoretic point of view this still is not the right level of generality for a problem of this type. There are two natural ways to pose the problem (for simplicity below we restrict ourselves to countable vocabulary): Problem 1. Characterize the pairs of countable models M , N such that in some forcing extension, n M/F n N/F for some non-principal ultrafilter F.
Problem 2. Characterize the pairs of countable models M , N with nonisomorphic ultrapowers modulo any non-principal ultrafilter F, M ω /F, N ω /F in some forcing extension. (I.e., the negation is: such that for every forcing extension in which for some non-principal ultrafilter F on ω we have M ω /F N ω /F.) M n /F , and F are non-principal ultrafilters on ω, then M 1 ≡ M 2 ⇒ M 1 ∼ = M 2 . On the other hand, if 2 ℵ 0 > ℵ 1 , then by [Sh:c, Ch VI] for every regular cardinal θ, ℵ 1 ≤ θ < 2 ℵ 0 we have an ultrafilter F θ on ω such that the down cofinality of (ω, <) ω /F θ above ω is θ so θ 1 = θ 2 ⇒ (ω, <) ω /F θ 1 (ω, <) ω /F θ 2 . This gives negative results on Problem 2(B) below.
We may also
Problem 5. For which quadruples (M 1 , N 1 , M 2 , N 2 ) of countable models, in some forcing extension for some ultrafilter F on ω, M ω 1 /F ∼ = N ω 1 /F but ?? M ω 2 /F M ω 1 /F (and other variants as above).
The present paper is dedicated to shading some further light. Working on [Sh 405] we had hoped to continue it sometime. However, we actually began only when Jarden asked: ( * ) Suppose that F n are finite fields (for n < ω, = 1, 2) satisfying F 1 n F 2 n . Can we have (a universe and) an ultrafilter F on ω such that n<ω F 1 n /F and n<ω F 2 n /F are elementaily equivalent but not isomorphic?
That was not an arbitrary question: he knew that many such pairs of ultraproducts are elementaily equivalent, because the first order theory of a field F which is isomorphic to an ultraproduct of finite fields is determine by its characteristic and its subfield of algebraic elements. Hence we can find an equivalence relation E k on the family of finite fields for k < ω, each with finitely many equivalence classes such that if F 1 n , F 2 n are finite fields for n < ω and F is a non pricipal ultrafilter on ω and for each k the set {n < ω : (F 1 n )E k (F 2 n )} belongs to F then the respective ultraproducts are elementary equivalent.
When Jarden asked me, I inquire whether it has the strong independence property and told him what it is, he says yes. Years later finishing the work on the paper he deny any knowledge on this, and this is my recollection. Cherlin, to whom he refer me, give me the reference to the strong independence property for finite fields: Duret [Du80, .
Here we continue [Sh 326, §3], [Sh 405, §1]. To give an affirmative answer to ( * ), we show that after adding ℵ 3 Cohen reals to a suitable ground model, one gets a universe with an ultrafilter F on ω and a sequence of models M n : n < ω on ω such that ( * * ) if N n = (P n ∪ Q n , P n , Q n , R n ) (for = 1, 2, n < ω), P n ∪ Q n ⊆ ω, and
n /F are models of the canonical theory t ind of the strong independence property (see Definition 1.5 below), then every isomorphism from
M n /F for some models M n with universe ω or what is equivalent but hopefully more transparent if F is an
n /F then we can find unary functions F n from N 1 n onto N 2 n for every n < ω such that the set of n for which F n is an isomorphism from N 1 n onto N 2 n belongs to the ultrafilter and
Our forcing is adding ℵ 3 Cohen reals, but we need that our model of set theory, i.e. the universe over which we force, satisfies some conditions. There are two ways to get a "suitable" ground model. The first way involves taking any ground model which satisfies a portion of the GCH, and extending it by an appropriate preliminary forcing, which generically adds the name for an ultrafilter which will appear after addition of the Cohen reals. The alternative approach, which we consider more model-theoretic, is to start with an L-like ground model and use instances of diamond (or related weaker principles) to prove that a sufficiently generic name already exists in the ground model. We will fully present the first approach -the second one should be then an easy modification of the arguments presented in [Sh 405, §1].
Our presentation is slightly more general than needed for (**). By allowing more what we call "bigness" properties to be involved in the definition of App, we leave room for getting analogs of (**) for more classes of models (getting the conclusion for all of them at once, or possibly only for some) -as long as the respective bigness notions are as in Definition 1.4. This, we hope, would be helpful in connection with the Problems above (particularly problem ?? and 5). For the problem on fields only the case associated with the strong independence property is needed; general bigness notions appear for possible general treatment.
Let us comment on our general point of view. In this paper we try to advance in Problems 1+2(A) and for this, it seemed, we can take the maximal Γ , i.e., allow all ℵ 0 -bigness notions. However, concerning Problem 3 (investigating the partial order ≤ or models), for showing M N , the construction causes N ω /F to be almost always non ℵ 3 -saturated. We need finer tools for them e.g. using some bigness notion but not others.
The two previous papers benefited from Gregory Cherlin, the present one benefited from Andrzej Ros lanowski, thank you! We continue those investigations in [Sh:F503].
Notation 0.3. Our notation is standard and compatible with that of classical textbooks (like Chang and Keisler [CK] and Jech [J] ). In forcing we keep the older convention that a stronger condition is the larger one.
(1) We will use two forcing notions denoted by C ℵ 3 and App (see Definitions 2.1 and 2.4, respectively). Conditions in these forcing notions will be called p, q, r (with possible sub/super-scripts). (2) All names for objects in forcing extensions will be denoted with a tilde below (e.g., ã, p). (3) The letter τ (with possible sub/super-scripts) stands for a vocabulary of a first order language; we may also write τ (M ), τ (T ) for a model M or theory T with the obvious meaning. We will use the letters p, q (with sub/super-scripts) to denote types. (4) The universe of a model M will be denoted |M |, but we will often abuse this notation and write, e.g., a ∈ M . The cardinality of a set A will be denoted A , and, for a model M , M will stand for the cardinality of its universe.
Comment: Why the ℵ 3 ? We like to have a preliminary forcing notion App which for some κ, is κ-complete, κ + -c.c., κ <κ = κ; so that every cardinal is preserved But for κ = ℵ 1 , A ⊆ κ + countable the number of conditions with this domains (i.e. the number of names of ultrafilters on ω as above) is more than κ hence in the natural choice the κ-c.c mail fail, we may remedied this but it is easier to use a cardinal κ such that µ < κ ⇒ µ ℵ 0 < κ.
Bigness notions
In this section we will quote relevant definitions and results from [Sh:e, Chapters . Let T be a complete first order theory (in a vocabulary τ ), and K = K T be a class of models of T partially ordered by ≺, being as elementary submodel. Also let t be a first order theory with a countable vocabulary τ (t) (including equality, treating function symbols as predicates).
(
A place is A-place for some A (alternatively use only M ≺ C of cardinality <κ, where C isκ-saturated model of T , as in [Sh:c]). (2) For A ⊆ M ∈ K we let K = K A,M be the class
We call it the (A, M )-place. (1) A local bigness notion Γ for K (without parameters, in one variable x) is a function with domain K which for every model M ∈ K gives
A local bigness notion Γ for K with parameters 1 from A is defined similarly but Dom(Γ) is an A-place K in K. 
, where ϕ R ∈ L(τ ) andā R is a sequence of appropriate length of elements of M . So R is interpreted as
The interpreted model is called M [φ] and we demand that it is a model of t ; so in particular M [φ] is a τ t -model and its universe is {a ∈ M : M |= ϕ = (a, a, a = ), c)} soger )?? divided by ϕ = (x, y,ā = ) which we demand is an equivalence relation; here usually equality on its domains, so we may write just ϕ = (x,¯a = ) or just ϕ(x,ā) (6) For a pre t-bigness notion scheme Γ = ψ Γ and an interpretation ϕ of t in M ∈ K with parameters from A ⊆ M , we define theφ-derived local pre-bigness notion Γ = Γ ψ,φ = Γ ψ [φ] with parameters from A ⊆ M (in the K A,M -place) as follows:
In full we may write Γ = Γ (ψ,t,φ) (7) We say ψ is a t-bigness notion (for T ) if for every interpretationφ of t in some A-place K ⊆ K, Γ t,ψ,φ is an invariant local bigness notion for our fixed K. If there is no T mention or understood we mean "for every T ". So it is enough in (8) above if we define
(1) If Γ is a local bigness notion for K with parameters in A, M ∈ K A,M and p(x) is a Γ-big type in M , then it can be extended to Γ-big type q in M which is a complete type over M . is Γ (t,ψ,φ) -big" depend just (M τ ,ā) whenever the formulas inφ and ϑ belong to L(τ ).
The following property is crucial in our application, the proofs give some amount of definability, "a local version" and we need to deduce from it a global one. This is a good property criterion for closing the gap which have in fact been used for t ind , see more systemativaly in [Sh:F503]. Definition 1.4. Let t be a first order theory in a vocabulary τ (t). Suppose that ψ is a t-bigness notion scheme, P / ∈ τ (t) is a unary predicate, and ϑ(y, x) is a τ (t)-formula. We say that ψ is (ℵ 2 , ℵ 1 )-(P, ϑ)-separative whenever the following condition ( )
is an interpretation of t in M and X ⊆ |M | is of cardinality at most ℵ 1 , includes all parameters ofφ and:
We may Definition 1.5 (See [Sh:e, Def. 3.4, 3.5, Chapter XI]).
(1) t ind = t ind 0 is the first order theory in vocabulary τ (t ind ) = {P, Q, R}, where P, Q are unary predicates and R is a binary predicate, including sentences (∀x)(∀y)(x R y ⇒ P (x) ∧ Q(y)), and (∀x)(P (x) ∨ Q(x)) and saying that for each n < ω and any pairwise distinct elements a 1 , . . . , a 2n ∈ P , there is c ∈ Q such that
(2) We define a pre t ind -bigness notion scheme Γ ind as follows. The sentence ψ ind says that P * ⊆ Q and (P, Q, R, P * ) satisfies: for every n < ω, there is a finite set A ⊆ P such that for every distinct a 1 , . . . , a 2n ∈ P \ A there is c ∈ P * satisfying a R c for ≤ n, and ¬a R c for n < ≤ 2n.
(So ψ Γ ind is not first order.) (3) We say that a first order theory T has the strong independence property if some formula ϑ(x, y) define a two place relation which is a model of t ind 1 with P, Q chosen i.e. for M |= T define the τ t ind
, π ∈ Aut(M ) and π P M is definable in M * (so with parameters in M * ), then so is π. 
[of course, if ∆ is closed under negation, then we have "if and only if".]
The forcing notion App
As explained in the introduction, we work in a Cohen generic extension of a suitable ground model. In this section we present how that ground model can be obtained: we start with V |= GCH and we force with the forcing notion App defined in 2.4 below , the App comes for approximations, as the members are approxiamtions to a name for an ultrafilter as we desire.
Definition 2.1.
(1) The Cohen forcing adding ℵ 3 Cohen reals is denoted by C ℵ 3 . Thus a condition p in C ℵ 3 is a finite partial function from ℵ 3 × ω to ω, and the order of C ℵ 3 is the natural one. The canonical C ℵ 3 -name for β th Cohen real will be called x β .
(2) Let A ⊆ ℵ 3 . For a condition p ∈ C ℵ 3 , its restriction to A × ω is called p A, and we let
For a sequence A n : n < ω of non-empty sets (and A ⊆ ℵ 3 ), we define
f is a function with domain ω, and such that f (n) ∈ A n for every n },
and similarly for models. (4) For A ⊆ ℵ 3 and m < ω, let I m A be the set of all ω-sequences of canonical C A -names for subsets of ω m . Let Qs (fors ∈ I m A , m < ω) be an m-ary predicate, Qs 0 = Qs 1 whenevers 0 =s 1 i.e. even when they are forced to be equal they may be different as sequences of names, and let
A be a C A -name for the τ A -model with universe ω such that ifs = s n : n < ω ∈ I m A , then C A (Qs) M n A = s n . So the vocabulary τ A is an object in V not a name. (5) If A 1 ⊆ A 2 , and for = 1, 2 F is a C A -name of an ultrafilter on ω then F 1 = F 2 A 1 means that F 1 ⊆ F 2 , so F 2 A 2 is unique but not always well defined.
Definition 2.2.
F is a C A -name of a non principal ultrafilter on ω }, and (α) G(A, F ) is a non empty set of triples (t, ψ ,φ ), where 3 t is a first order theory (or just a C A -name of a first order theory), ψ is a C A -name of t-bigness notion scheme, andφ is (a C A -name for) an interpretation of t in
We say that G is full whenever the following condition holds.
( ) Assume (A, F ) ∈ Dom(G) and t is a C A -name of a first order theory in the vocabulary τ (t) ∈ H(ℵ 1 ), ψ is a C A -name for a pre t-bigness notion scheme,
M n A /F ; no need for parameters as all elements are interpretation of an individual constant. Suppose (t, ψ ,φ ) is forced to define a bigness notion
[The main case for us is t = t ind , Γ = Γ ind .]
The clause 2.2(2) is added for our particular application. It can be replaced by use of a family bigness notions relevant to your interest. Proposition 2.3.
(1) There is a full (ℵ 3 , ℵ 2 )-bigness guide G. Definition 2.4. Let G be an (ℵ 3 , ℵ 1 )-bigness guide. We define the forcing notion App = App G . (When G is fixed, as typically in the present paper, we will not mention it.)
the type realized by x β over the model
(so it is a type in the vocabulary τ A∩β ) is Γ β -big and complete of course, and moreover this type is a C A∩β -name. We call it "the type induced by x β according to q".
(2) The order ≤ App = ≤ of App = App G is the natural one:
We say that q 2 ∈ App is an end extension of q 1 ∈ App, and we write
One easily checks that Proposition 2.5.
(1) If q ∈ App, β < ℵ 3 , then q β ∈ App and q β ≤ end q.
(2) Both ≤ App and ≤ end are partial orders on App.
Lemma 2.6. If q ζ : ζ < ξ is an increasing sequence of members of App, ξ ≤ ℵ 1 , and q ζ 1 ≤ end q ζ 2 for ζ 1 < ζ 2 , then there is q ∈ App such that A q = ζ<ξ A q ζ and q ζ ≤ end q for all ζ < ξ.
Proof. We may assume that ξ > 0 is a limit ordinal. If cf(ξ) > ℵ 0 , then we let
additionally we have to extend ζ<ξ F q ζ to a C A q -name of an ultrafilter on ω, which is no problem.
Lemma 2.7. Suppose that q ∈ App, A q ⊆ γ ∈ ℵ 3 , and p is a C A q -name of a type over the model
(1) If cf(γ) < ℵ 2 , then there is a condition r ∈ App stronger than q such that A r = A q ∪ {γ}, and
(2) If cf(γ) = ℵ 2 , (t, ψ,φ ) ∈ G(A q , F q ) and the type p is (forced to be) Γ ψ [φ ]-big, then there is a condition r ∈ App as in (1) and such that
Proof. 1) Extend F q to F r so that x γ /F r realizes the required type.
2) Note that every Γ ψ [φ ]-big type can be extended to a complete Γ ψ [φ ]-big one by 1.2.
Lemma 2.8.
(1) Suppose q 0 , q 1 , q 2 ∈ App, q 0 = q 2 β, q 0 ≤ q 1 , A q 1 ⊆ β. Suppose further that A q 2 \ A q 0 = {β} and cf(β) = ℵ 2 . Assume further that p 1 is a C A q 1 -name for a complete Γ q 2 β -big type over (
A q 1 /F q 1 ) such that p 1 contains the type p 0 induced by x β according to q 2 (such p 1 necessarily exists, by the properties of bigness). Then there is q 3 ≥ q 1 , q 2 with A q 3 = A q 1 ∪ {β}, such that x β induces p 1 on (
This clause is like the first one except the cofinalities. (3) Assume that δ 1 , δ 2 < ℵ 2 , and β j : j < δ 2 is a non-decreasing sequence of ordinals below ℵ 3 . Let p i : i < δ 1 be an increasing sequence from App. Suppose that q j ∈ App β j (for j < δ 2 ) are such that:
q j ≤ end q j for j < j < δ 2 . Then there is an r ∈ App with p i ≤ r and q j ≤ end r for all i < δ 1 and j < δ 2 . (4) Ifp = p i : i < δ 1 an increasing sequence in App, δ 1 < ℵ 2 , thenp has an upper bound in App.
Proof. 1) Let A i = A q i and let F i = F q i for i < 3, and A 3 = A 1 ∪ A 2 = A 1 ∪ {β}. The only possibly not clear part is to show that, in V C A 3 , there is an ultrafilter extending F 1 ∪ F 2 which contains F , the family of all the sets
= m, and a C A 1 -nameā of an m-tuple from ω * A 1 (and in our notation aboveā(n) is a C A 1 -name for an m-tuple of elements of ω). As F 1 , F 2 , F are (forced, i.e., C A 3 ) to be closed under intersections (of two, and hence of finitely many), clearly if this fails, then (as F 0 is forced to be a non-principal ultrafilter on ω so m < ω ⇒ [m, ω) ∈ F 0 ) there is a condition p ∈ C A 3 , a C A 1 -name ã of a member of F 1 , a C A 2 -name b of a member of F 2 , a (name for a) τ A 1 -formula φ and a C A 1 -name for an m-tupleā from ω * A 1 such that
We may easily eliminate parameters, so we may assume that we have φ [x β (n)] only (remember the definition of τ A 1 ). Let p i = p A i for i = 0, 1, 2, and let H 0 ⊆ C A 0 be generic over V such that p 0 ∈ H 0 . For n < ω let Ã * n be a C A 0 -name such that
is (the interpretation of) an unary predicate from τ A 0 ; in fact Q Ã * n :n<ω is such a predicate. Thus, in V[H 0 ], either Ã * (x) ∈ p 0 or ¬Ã * (x) ∈ p 0 . The latter is impossible by the choice of p 0 , so necessarily Ã * (x) ∈ p 0 . As also
(remember p 1 is a type over
. Consequently, we may find a condition p 1 ∈ H 1 ⊆ C A 1 stronger than p 1 , an integer n < ω, and an element y ∈ M n A 1 (so y ∈ ω) such that
As F 0 , Ã * n is a C A 0 -name, we really have y ∈ Ã * n [H 0 ], and hence (by its definition) for some p 2 ∈ C A 2 we have p 2 ≤ p 2 , p 2 A 0 ∈ H 0 , and p 2 " y = x β (n) and n ∈ b ". Now for our n we can force n ∈ ã ∩b ∩c by amalgamating the corresponding conditions p 1 , p 2 , getting a contradiction. As said above this finishes the proof of the existence of q 3 .
2) The proof is essentially contained in the previous one (use the very trivial bigness notion: ϕ(x,ā) is big in M if and only if M |= (∃x)ϕ(x,ā), so we may use a p 1 ). See also the end of the proof of (3).
3) We will prove by induction on γ ∈ ℵ 3 that if all β j ≤ γ and all p i belong to App γ, then the assertion in (3) holds for some r ∈ App γ. We may assume that δ 1 > 0 (otherwise apply 2.6) and δ 2 > 0 (otherwise let δ 2 = 1, β 0 = 0, q 0 ∈ App 0 be above p i 0 for i < δ 1 ; so it just means F q 0 is the ultrafilter extending F p i 0 for i < δ 1 ; now if γ = 0, then r = q 0 is as required and otherwise we have reduced the case δ 2 = 0 to the case δ 2 = 1).
We may assume that β j = sup{α + 1 : α ∈ A q j } (for j < δ 2 ), and also that the sequence β j : j < δ 2 is strictly increasing. Let β = sup j<δ 2 β j and let q = (
q j ), this triple is not necessarily a member of App.
We first assume cf(γ) = ℵ 0 .
If γ = β, then q ∈ App and we may take r = q. So let us assume β < γ. If δ 2 is a successor ordinal, or a limit ordinal of uncountable cofinality, then we let q * = q (clearly q * ∈ App β). If cf(δ 2 ) = ℵ 0 , then we may first apply the inductive hypothesis to p i β : i < δ 1 (and β j , q j : j < δ 2 ) to get a condition q * ∈ App β which is stronger than all p i β and which end-extends all q j . So in all these cases, we have a condition q * ∈ App β end extending all q j for j < δ 2 and stronger than all p i β for i < δ 1 (and we are looking for its end-extension which is a bound to all p i β).
The case γ = γ 0 + 1, a successor In this case our inductive hypotheses applies to the p i γ 0 , q * , and γ 0 , yielding r 0 in App γ 0 with p i γ 0 ≤ r 0 and q * ≤ end r 0 . What remains to be done is an amalgamation of r 0 with all of the p i , where A p i ⊆ A r 0 ∪ {γ 0 }, and where one may as well suppose that γ 0 is in A p i for all i. This is a slight variation on (1) or (2). For instance, suppose cf(γ 0 ) = ℵ 2 . We let
F p i (the latter might be only a C A 2 -name of a filter). • For i < δ 1 let p i be the C A p i ∩γ 0 -name for the (Γ • Let p 1 be (a C A 1 -name for) a complete Γ /F r 0 according to a condition p 3 which we will choose below so necessarily it extends ∪ i<δ p ĩ ) Now, in V C A 3 , we want to extend F 1 ∪ F 2 to an ultrafilter F containing the sets of the form {n < ω : M n A 3 |= φ [x γ 0 (n)]} for all φ (x) ∈ p 1 . If this fails, then as
we find a condition p ∈ C A 3 , a C A 1 -name ã of a member of F 1 , and i < δ 1 , and a C A 2 -name b for a member of F i , and φ such that
Next we continue exactly as in the proof of (1).
The case γ is a limit ordinal of cofinality ℵ 2 Since δ 1 < ℵ 2 there is some γ 0 < γ such that all p i lie in App γ 0 and β < γ 0 , and the induction hypothesis then yields the claim.
The case γ is a limit ordinal of cofinality ℵ 1 Choose a strictly increasing and continuous sequence γ j : j < ℵ 1 with supremum γ, starting with γ 0 = β. By induction on j choose r j ∈ App γ j (for j < ℵ 1 ) such that:
• r 0 = q * ; • r j ≤ end r j for j < j < ℵ 1 ; • p i γ j ≤ r j for i < δ 1 and j < ℵ 1 .
[Thus, at a successor stage j + 1, the inductive hypothesis is applied to p i γ j+1 , r j , γ j , and γ j+1 . At a limit stage j, we apply the inductive hypothesis to p i γ j for i < δ 1 , r j for j < j, γ j for j < j, and γ j .] Finally, we let r = (
r j ). Clearly r ∈ App is as required.
Now we are going to consider the remaining case:
The case γ is a limit ordinal of cofinality ℵ 0 If β < γ (where β is as defined at the beginning of the proof), then we first pick a strictly increasing sequence γ j : j < ℵ 0 of ordinals such that β ≤ γ 0 and sup j<ℵ 0 γ j = γ. Then we apply repeatedly the inductive hypothesis to build a sequence q j : j < ℵ 0 such that q j ∈ App γ j , q j 0 ≤ end q j 1 for j 0 < j 1 , q j ≤ end q 0 (for all j < ℵ 0 ), and p i γ j ≤ q j (for all i < δ 1 , j < ℵ 0 ). Thus we have reduced this sub-case to the only one remaining: β = γ. Now if for some j < δ 2 we have β j = γ, then r = q j is as required, so without loss of generality (∀j < δ 2 )(β j < γ). Then necessarily cf(δ 2 ) = ℵ 0 and we may equally well assume that δ 2 = ℵ 0 .
We take q as defined earlier (so it is the "union" of all q j ), but it does not have to be a condition in App: the filter j<ℵ 0 F q j does not have to be an ultrafilter, and we need to extend it to one that contains also
A q j def = A + , but there might be C A * -names for elements of i<δ 1 F p i that are not C A q j -names for any j < ℵ 0 , so it could happen that one name like that is forced to be disjoint from some element of F q j . So assume toward contradiction, that there are a condition p ∈ C A + , ordinals i < δ 1 and j < ℵ 0 , a C A p i -name ã , and a C A q j -name b such that
Increasing j if necessary, we may also assume that p ∈ C A q j so Dom(p) ⊆ β j × ω. Let H 0 ⊆ C A p i ∩β j be generic over V such that p A p i ∈ H 0 , and let c = {n ∈ ω : there is a condition p ∈ C A p i stronger than p A p i and such that p (A p i ∩ β j ) ∈ H 0 and p C A p i " n ∈ ã "}.
For this n we take p ∈ C A p i witnessing that n ∈ c and next we let p * = p ∪ p . Clearly p * n ∈ ã ∩ b , a contradiction. 4) Follows, i.e., it is the case δ 2 = 0 of part (3).
Lemma 2.9. Assume V |= GCH. The forcing notion App satisfies the ℵ 3 -chain condition, it is ℵ 2 -complete, App = ℵ 3 and App γ ≤ ℵ 2 for every γ ∈ ℵ 3 . Consequently, the forcing with App does not collapse cardinals nor changes cofinalities, and App GCH.
Proof. The only perhaps unclear part is the chain condition. Suppose we have an antichain {q α : α ∈ ℵ 3 & cf(α) = ℵ 2 } ⊆ App (the index α is taken to vary over ordinals of cofinality ℵ 2 just for convenience). An important point is that G can "offer" at most ℵ 2 candidates for the bigness notion at δ < ℵ 3 , cf(δ) = ℵ 2 , hence for each γ ∈ ℵ 3 the restricted forcing App γ has cardinality ≤ ℵ 2 . Applying Fodor's lemma twice, we find a stationary set S ⊆ {α ∈ ℵ 3 : cf(α) = ℵ 2 } and a condition q * ∈ App such that (∀α ∈ S)(q α α = q * ). Pick α 1 , α 2 ∈ S such that sup(A qα 1 ) < α 2 ; it follows from Lemma 2.8(1) that the conditions q α 1 , q α 2 are compatible, a contradiction.
Proposition 2.10.
(1) For each p ∈ App and α ∈ ℵ 3 , there is a condition q ∈ App stronger than p and such that α ∈ A q . (2) F def = {F r : r ∈ G App } is a C ℵ 3 -name for a non principal ultrafilter on ω. Also, for each r ∈ G App we have:
Proof. Should be clear (for (1) use 2.7 + 2.8(3); then (2) follows).
Definition 2.11.
(1) Suppose G App ⊆ App is generic over V, V * = V[G App ]. We let F δ be the C δ -name for the restriction F δ of the ultrafilter F to the sets from the universe (V * ) C δ . (2) We define an App-name Γ δ of a C δ -name as Γ p δ for every p ∈ G App such that δ ∈ A p . (So it is an App * C δ -name.) Lemma 2.12.
(1) Suppose that G App ⊆ App is generic over V, V * = V[G App ], and δ < ℵ 3 , cf(δ) = ℵ 2 , and
Proof. By 2.7(1)+2.7(3). We can use some x β with β of cofinality less than ℵ 2 to realize each type.
Definability
Hypothesis 3.1. In this section we assume that G is an (ℵ 3 , ℵ 2 )-bigness guide, App = App G , G ⊆ App is a generic filter over V, and
For an ordinal δ < ℵ 3 , we let G δ = G ∩ (App δ). Also, H , H δ are the canonical C ℵ 3 -and C δ -names of the generic subsets of C ℵ 3 and C δ , respectively. We work mostly in V * .
[Note that, by Lemma 2.9, V * |= GCH.]
Definition 3.2.
(1) We say that m is an (ℵ 3 , ℵ 2 )-isomorphism candidate (or just an isomorphism candidate, in V or in V * , see below; letting m − = t, ψ ,φ , ∆ , Ñ n : n < ω, = 1, 2 , note that as App is ℵ 2 -complete, this forcing does not add new m − , i.e., V and V * have the same set of m − , though we have an App-name m of such object) if:
; and p * (ii) t, ψ ,φ are C A * -names as in 2.2(3), ∆ ⊆ L(τ , (t)) is a C A * -name and Γ = Γ (t,ψ ,φ ,) is a bigness notion as there, τ (t) countable for simplicity; we can assume τ (t) is an object (not a name) by adding for each m, ℵ 0 predicates with m places said (by t) to be empty. (iii) Ñ n , for n < ω and ∈ {1, 2}, are C A * -names for countable models of a (countable) theory t n , and the universes |Ñ n | are subsets of ω and with vocabulary τ (t). Also it is forced (i.e., C ℵ 3 ) that t = Th
(iv) We have predicates Q R ∈ τ A * (for R ∈ τ (t)) such thatφ = Q R : R ∈ τ (t) is the interpretation of τ (t) in ??
(Remember 2.1(4), 1.4(1); so by the choice of τ A actuallyφ * =φ * .) (v) F is a C ℵ 3 -name (more accurately an App-name of such name, but we sometimes write F instead of F [G] as when G is constant) and p * ∈ C ℵ 3 is a condition such that:
"F represents a ∆ -embedding modulo F ".
[If m is clear from the context we may omit it.]
Then there is a stationary set of ordinals δ < ℵ 3 such that:
(a) δ A * ⊆ δ, cf(δ) = ℵ 2 , and p * ∈ C ℵ 3 δ, and for some q ∈ G we have that
For such δ, we let
The Main Isomorphism Theorem 3.4. Assume that m is an (ℵ 3 , ℵ 2 )-isomorphism candidate as in 3.3, and δ < ℵ 3 is as there. Then there are q δ , y such that (a) q δ ∈ App, moreover q δ ∈ G, and q δ as in 3.3, (which is dense and quite closed, see there)
[Clearly it is a C Aδ -name, or an
δ ) m for m < ω so that they are (App, C δ )-names and (q δ A δ , p * ) forces ( ) 1 R δ,m includes the graph of F δ , i.e., ifā is an m-tuple from
forces): (⊕) 1 ifā 1 ,ā 2 are finite sequences of the same length m of members of N 1 δ , and
under F of the ∆ -type which
Also notice that the clauses (b) δ , (c) δ of 3.3 above say that
preserving ∆ -formulas; in the main case it is "onto".
The proof of the Main Isomorphism Theorem 3.4. The proof of 3.4 is broken into several steps and lemmas. Note that we use the countability of t. Take a condition q δ ∈ G such that
, and p * ∈ C A q δ , and (B) q δ the condition q δ forces (in App) that clauses (b) δ , (c) δ and (d) δ from 3.3 hold true (so in particular q δ forces that
Ñ 2 n and ( * ) p * ỹ * ,δ holds), and (C) q δ if x is a C A q δ -name for a member of
Before we continue with the proof of 3.4, let us note the following.
Lemma 3.5. Let δ < ℵ 3 , q δ ∈ App and ỹ * , p * be as above. Suppose that
Let θ * be a C A * -name of a τ (t)-formula. Assume further that x , x and ỹ , ỹ are C A q -names, and p * ≤ p ∈ C A q , and the condition p A q forces (in C A q ) that
Ñ 1 n , and ỹ , ỹ ∈ n<ω Ñ 2 n , and (β) the types of (x , ỹ ) and of (x , ỹ ) over
e., the vocabulary and the ω structures are from
Then the following conditions are equivalent.
(A) There is r 0 ∈ App such that q δ , q ≤ r 0 , r 0 δ ∈ G ∩ (App δ), and
(B) There is r 1 ∈ App such that q δ , q ≤ r 1 , r 1 δ ∈ G ∩ (App δ) and
Proof. By symmetry it suffices to show that (A) implies (B). So suppose that r 0 is as in (A). We may also assume that A r 0 = A q δ ∪ A q (just replace q by the stronger condition r δ δ if needed). Let us go back to the proof of 3.4. We define some C δ -names; recall
there are a τ (t)-formula ∈ ∆ and conditions p ∈ C ℵ 3 and r 0 ∈ App such that p * ≤ p, p δ ∈ H δ , x , ỹ are C A r 0 ∩δ -names, and q δ ≤ r 0 , r 0 δ ∈ G ∩ (App δ), and
and
, if the types realized by (x /F δ , ỹ /F δ ) and (x /F δ , ỹ /F δ ) over the model
δ . Now, most clauses of 3.4 should be clear; we say more on (d)(vii,viii), for notational simplicity for m = 1.
We let
Thus the proof of 3.4 is completed.
Conclusion 3.6. In V[G][H ℵ 3 ], for each m, there is a stationary set S ⊆ {δ < ℵ 3 : cf(δ) = ℵ 2 } and conditions q, q δ ∈ App such that for each δ ∈ S:
• clauses (a) δ -(d) δ of 3.3 are satisfied,
• q δ ∈ G, q δ δ = q, q δ , ỹ δ as in 3.3, • the conclusion of 3.4 holds, • for every δ 1 , δ 2 ∈ S there is a one-to-one order preserving function h : A q δ 1 onto −→ A q δ 2 (so it is the identity on A q ) which maps
• in particular p δ = p * for δ ∈ S, so the last clause in 3.4 holds for M ℵ 3 .
Proof. Straightforward.
A Crucial Automorphism
Definition 4.1. We say that x is an auto type if:
is a one to one function which is for L(τ A q ) elementary from the model
Claim 4.1.1. Assume that x = (q, r, s, γ, f ) is an auto type and γ ≤ γ < ω 3 and r ≤ end r ∈ App γ , q γ ≤ r then there is s such that (α) (q , r , s , γ , f ) is an auto type (β) q ≤ end q and ?? min(
For β = γ we get the desired conclusion. Case 1 For β = γ this holds by the assumption.
Case 2 β > γ, β a limit ordinal of cofinality > ℵ 0 .
Use 2.6 to define q, r β , s β and easily they are as required.
Case 3 β > γ and ∪{α + 1, α ∈ A r ∩ β \ γ} < β. Let s β = s β for any β < β large enough.
Case 4 β > γ and ∪{α + 1 : α ∈ A q ∩ β \ γ} = β. The proof is by 2.x ??
Case 5 Otherwise, there are tree subcases
Subcase 5c β > γ is a limit ordinal of cofinality ℵ 0 , β = sup(A q ∩ β)
So we know what A s β should be, A r β call it A and we need to show that there is C A s β -name F such that: it is a C A r β -name such that F[H A r β ] is an ultrafilter on ω containing the consisting of the family following ??
(α) F s β−1 if β is a successor ordinal and ∪{F , so it becomes like subcase (5b), and subcase (5b) is just easier than subcase (5a). We first deal with subcase (5b). Ã * n [H 0 ] = {m 0 :m 0 ∈ k 0 ω and there ism 1 = m 0 1, : < k 1 ∈ k 0 ω and p * 1 ∈ C A 1 such that p 1 ≤ p 1 and p 1 "n ∈ ã, ρ k<k 0 (b k )(n) = m 1, and M n A q β |= ϑ 1 (m 0 ,m 1 )}. But we have to deal with W = W ϑ 2 (y,c,...,c k 2 −1 ) . First note that, as r β ∈ App we have if B n ⊆ ω is a C A 0 -name, Q = Q B n :n<ω is a (k 1 )-place predicate from τ A 2 = τ A r δ and in
is Γ δ -small then we can above replace ϑ 1 (y 0 , . . . , y k 0 −1 , y 0 , . . . , y k 1 −1 ) by ϑ 1 (y 0 , . . . , y k 0 −1 , y 0 , . . . , y k 1 −1 )&¬Q(y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y k 1 −1 ) Subcase (5a) This time A * n [h 0 ] = {m 0 m : m 0 ∈ k 0 ω, m < ω and there is m 1 = m 1, : < k 1 ∈ k 1 ω and p 1 ∈ C A 1 such that p 1 ≤ p 1 , m 1,0 = m and p 1 "n ∈ ã, k<k 0 (b )(n) = m 1, " and M n A q β |= ϑ 1 (m 0 ,m 1 )} Let QĀ be the (k 0 + 1)-place predicate in τ A 0 corresponding to the sequenceĀ * = A * n : n < ω , see 2.1. Note that p 2 "in the model
(Why? because that formula belongs to the type that x δ realize which should be Γ δ -large. By claim 1.2(2) p 2 "in the model
is Γ δ -large, hence is satisfiable", we can continue as in subcase (5b).
Back to Model Theory
In this section we present just enough to solve the problem on finite fields. SAHARON SHELAH Definition 5.1. Let M be a model. Assume
are models of t 0 interpreted in M by the sequencesφ 1 ,φ 2 of formulas with parameters from M , and they have the same vocabulary τ * = τ (N 1 ) = τ (N 2 ). Furthermore, let Γ be an invariant bigness notion in M (over some set A 0 of < κ parameters, more exactly in K (M,A 0 ) ), and ∆ ⊆ L ω,ω (τ (N 1 )) and κ > ℵ 0 (for simplicity).
(1) We say that (
for every ∆-embedding F of N 1 into N 2 , and for every Γ-big type p 0 (x) inside M of cardinality < κ, there is a Γ-big type p 1 (x) inside M of cardinality < κ which includes p 0 (x) and such that, letting
then we have the parallel of 3.4(vii), so (⊕) 1 ifā 1 ,ā 2 are finite finite sequences of the same length m of members of N 1 δ , and p ∪ {ϑ N 1 (x,ā 1 ), ¬ϑ N 1 (x,ā 2 )} is a Γ-big type over M δ , and ϑ, ¬ϑ ∈ ∆, then (ā 1 , F δ (ā 2 )) / ∈ R m . (⊕) 2 Above, we may replace ϑ, ¬ϑ by any pair ϑ 0 , ϑ 1 of contradictory formulas from ∆. (2) In part (1):
(i) We do not mention ∆ if it is the set of quantifier free formulas (of L ω,ω (τ (N 1 ))). (ii) We replace Γ by (t, ψ) if we mean "for all bigness notions of the form Γ = Γ (t,ψ,φ) , whereφ is an interpretation of t in M with < κ parameters and |t| < κ, ψ ∈ L κ,ω " (i.e., ψ ∈ L µ + ,ω for some µ < κ and in the vocabulary τ (t) ∪ {P * }). : n < ω be a sequence of models as above, that is each with a countable universe being the set of natural numbers for simplicity, all with the same vocabulary such that for every k and a sequence R n : n < ω with R n being a k-place relation on M n there is a k-place predicate in the common vocabulary satisfying R Mn = R n that a m + c has a square root and b m + c does not have a square root for m = 1, . . . , n. So the formula ϑ(x, y) = (∃z)(z 2 = x + y) is as required.
Of course, if the characteristic of the field is 2, then we naturally use the same theorem but choosing p = 3, so of course maybe the field fail to have all the p-th roots of the unit, however, as Duret does, in this case we consider an algebraic extension of N of order 3 by adding a root of x 3 − 1 hence all of them getting a new filed N * . Now the set of elements of N * can be represented as the set of triples of elements of N , and the operations of N * are definable in N ; so our problem is almost notational. E.g. we can note that recalling N = n<ω N n /F then N * = N * ,n /F where N * ,n is equal to N n if N n has three 3-th roots of the unit and an algebraic extension of N n of order three which has this property otherwise. Again the first order theory of N * has the strong independence property and for N 1 * , N 2 we get the desired conclusion; but any isomorphism from N 1 onto N 2 can be be extended to an isomorphismfrom N 1 * onto N 2 * and we can easily finish.
Proposition 5.4. Assume that M is a κ-complicated κ-compact model. Let N 1 , N 2 be interpretations of t ind 1 in M . Then for any isomorphism π from N 1 onto N 2 , the function π P N 1 is definable in M by a first order formula (with parameters).
Proof. Let N = Mφ (soφ has parameters in M ) and let F be an isomorphism from N 1 onto N 2 .
Let Γ be the bigness notion Γ (t ind ,ψ ind ,φ 1 ,) (so ψ ind ∈ L ω 1 ,ω ). Let A ⊆ M , |A| < κ and τ * ⊆ τ M , |τ * | < κ be given by the definition of being κ-complicated (applied to F ). Without loss of generality, A includes the parameters ofφ 1 ,φ 2 and is closed under F and F −1 , and for every n includes the finite set mentioned in 1.5(2).
Let R 1 be as in 5.1(1). Clearly, recalling Definition 1.5(2), there are no distinct a 1 , a 2 ∈ P N 1 \ A and b ∈ N 2 such that (a 1 , b), (a 2 , b) ∈ R 1 . Hence {(b, a) : (a, b) ∈ R 1 and a ∈ P N 1 } is the graph of a partial function from P N 2 into P N 1 which includes the graph of F −1 P N 2 . But F is one to one onto. Therefore, R 1 (P N 1 × P N 2 ) is the graph of F P N 1 . But R 1 P N 1 is definable in (M τ * , c) c∈A by a formula from L ∞,κ , so also F P N 1 is, and thus if N 1 , N 2 are models of t ind 1 also F is (by 1.6). Applying [Sh 72, 1.9] (or [Sh:e, Ch XI]) we conclude that it is definable by a first order formula with parameters from M , as required.
Similarly we can show the following.
Proposition 5.5. Assume that Γ is a (ℵ 2 , ℵ 1 )-(P, ϑ)-separative bigness notion, see Definition. Suppose that N 1 , N 2 are interpretations of t in M , and M is κ-compact κ-complicated (or just κ-complicated for Γ), κ > ℵ 0 .
(1) If F is an isomorphism from N 1 onto N 2 , then ( * ) 1 F P N 1 is definable in (M τ * , c) c∈A by a formula from L ∞,κ , recalling τ ⊆ τ M , |τ | < κ, A ⊆ M , |A| < κ. (2) If F is an embedding of N 1 into N 2 , then ( * ) 2 there is a partial function f from P N 2 into P N 1 which extends F −1 and is definable in (M τ * , c) c∈A by a formula from L ∞,κ , where τ * , A are as above.
Remark 5.6.
(1) The proposition 5.5 should be the beginning of an analysis of first order theories T . For more in this direction see [ respectively, provided λ = 2 κ , κ = κ <κ (so an approximation has size < κ). So let us assume that θ = θ <θ < κ = κ <κ < λ = κ + .
(a) For A ⊆ λ let C(A) = C A = {p : p is a partial function from Dom(p) ∈ [A] <θ to θ> 2 } ordered by
(b) We define App − G as the set of q = (A q , F q ) where A q ∈ [λ] <κ and F q is a C A q -name of a regular ultrafilter on θ such that for each α < λ, F q ∩ P(θ) V C(A q ∩α) is a C A q ∩α -name. (c) For α ∈ A ∈ [λ] <κ , x α is the C A -name {p(α) : p ∈ G C(A) of a member of θ θ. (d) We define Ñ ε A for ε < θ, A ∈ [λ] <κ as the following C A -name: it is a model with universe θ, τ Ñ ε A = {PR :R = R ε : ε < θ, for some m eachR ε is an m-place relation }, (PR ) Ñ ε A = R ε . [So we may think of τ Ñ ε A to be an old object whose members are indexed as PR , where each R ε is a C A -name. Or we can consider τ Ñ ε A to be a name and interpret it in V[G C(A) ].
private appendix
Moved from proof of Lemma label 1.15Proposition, no, 3.5
We want to define a respective condition Suppose toward contradiction that this is impossible and thus we have a condition p ∈ C A such that p forces " ã ∩ b ∩ Ã ∩ B = ∅ ". from proof of lemma 2.12 Problem (A) maybe q δ / ∈ App δ+1 and even ỹ * C is an C(A q δ ∩ (δ + 1))-name. (B) x δ has to realize an Γ δ -big type over
. . . over which is a C δ -name.
